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Abstract 
Since 1990’s, institution factors have been regarded as playing important roles in stimulating 
foreign direct investments (FDI). However, empirical studies on their importance in affecting 
FDI are still lacking especially for small open economies. This paper attempts to investigate the 
role of institutions upon the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) in a small open economy 
of Malaysia. Using bounds testing approach (ARDL model), the empirical findings reveal that 
there exists a long run relationship among FDI and the institution variables. Specifically, several 
institution variables namely government stability, bureaucracy, and corruption are found to play 
prominent roles in influencing the inflow of FDI. Thus, in attracting foreign investors, 
implementing FDI-friendly policies by providing and maintaining the quality of domestic 
institutions would be beneficial to Malaysian economic growth. 
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1. Introduction 
It is generally accepted that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has a favorable impact as a key 
driver in promoting long run economic growth, particularly for the less-developed countries 
(LDC’s), which have experienced a shortage of capital accumulation for their development. 
Verdier (2008) argues that domestic savings are linked with capital inflows where low savings 
rate attracts more inflows of capital. Indeed, most of the LDC’s which have effectively attracted 
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more FDI have undergone a persistency in their economic growth. Thus, most of the LDC’s are 
highly dependent on FDI as an engine of economic growth and have been trying to attract 
foreign investors particularly from Multinational Enterprises (MNE’s) by reducing barriers to 
FDI and offering various tax incentives and subsidies (Herzer, 2008). As a result, most of the 
LDC’s have been competing with each other in order to attract investment from MNE’s, 
particularly the foreign investors from the advanced nations.  
There is consensus among academic economists that FDI has a positive effect on 
economic growth. The significant effect of FDI on economic growth has motivated many 
researchers to study the main factors that determine the inflow of FDI across countries. The most 
important factors that determine the inflow of FDI are domestic market size, trade openness, cost 
of labour, persistency in economic growth as well as a low tax and tariff (see for example Ang 
(2008)).  
However, most of the prior studies have not taken into account the role of institutions on 
FDI. Since the late 1990’s, the literature on FDI has been renewed to focusing on the quality of 
institutions as among the key factors in explaining the inflow of FDI.  Quere et al. (2007) have 
stated three reasons why the quality of institutions may matter for attracting FDI. First, by raising 
productivity prospects, good governance and infrastructure may attract foreign investors. 
Second, poor institutions can bring additional costs to FDI (for example, in the case of 
corruption). The third reason is due to the sunk cost where FDI is especially vulnerable to any 
forms of uncertainties, including that stemming from poor government efficiency, policy 
reversals and weak enforcement of property rights and legal system in general. For that reason, 
by maintaining a quality institution, more investments can be attracted, which in turn can 
expedite the economic growth process.  
In Malaysian economy, FDI has been seen as a key driver in promoting the economic 
growth through export oriented industry. Policy reforms, including the introduction of the 
Investment Incentive Act in 1968, the establishment of free trade zones in the early 1970s, and 
the provision of export incentives alongside the acceleration of open economy in the 1980s have 
led to surge of FDI in the late 1980s (Ang, 2008, 2009). Apart from these policy factors, it is 
generally believed that sound macroeconomic management, sustained economic growth, and the 
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presence of a well functioning system, political stability, relatively low set-up costs, and a 
sufficiently trained labour cost have made Malaysia an attractive prospect for FDI.  
 
Figure 1: FDI inflows of Malaysia and neighbouring countries, 1989 – 2009 (USD Mil.) 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment, Foreign Direct Investment Database. 
 
 As can be seen in Figure 1, Malaysia experienced large FDI inflows as compared to its 
neighbours countries during early 1990s. This success was contributed by policy reforms that 
have taken place as early as 1968. In 1992, Malaysia received large amount of FDI, even higher 
than Singapore. However, after the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, Malaysia started losing to 
its neighbouring competitors. Thailand overtook Malaysia in 1998, then in 2005, Malaysia lost to 
Indonesia. Unfortunately, in 2009, all other countries won over Malaysia in attracting FDI. 
In term of macroeconomic conditions, Malaysia is relatively better than other 
neighbouring countries except Singapore. This indicates that policy variables and sound 
macroeconomic conditions are inadequate in explaining the inflow of FDI. Indeed, good 
institutions are believed to have positive influences on economic development through the 
promotion of domestic as well as foreign investments. Thus, it is expected that the quality of 
institutions play a vital role in attracting the inflow of FDI into Malaysia.  
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This paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, this paper examines 
the determinants of FDI inflow in Malaysia by focusing on several institution variables namely 
law and order, government stability, corruption, bureaucracy, and investment profile. Although 
Ang (2008) and Marial and Ngie (2009) have studied the determinants of FDI in Malaysia, none 
of them have considered the role of institution variables in their model. Better understanding of 
the role of institutions would be helpful to Malaysian leaders and policy makers so that 
appropriate actions can be taken in sustaining and encouraging the inflow of MNEs. Second, this 
paper uses a recent econometric technique, namely ARDL or bounds testing procedure proposed 
by Pesaran et al. (2001). The method is sufficient enough to deal with a short sample size, and it 
also allows a mixture of time series variables of I(0) and I(1) to be collectively estimated. Third, 
many previous studies investigate the role of institution by using cross sectional data or panel 
data methodology (see for example Busse and Hefeker (2007), Quere et al. (2007)). These 
techniques however, limit our understanding on the effect of institutions on individual country. 
Our study on Malaysia will thus shed some light on the importance of institutions in affecting 
FDIs for a small open economy. Our findings reveal that, there exist a long-run relationship 
among the FDI inflows and the institutional variables. Several institutional variables such as 
government stability, bureaucracy, and corruption are found to play important roles in 
influencing the inflow of FDI.  
The structure of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 provides a short review of 
the literature by focusing on the role of institutions variables on FDI. Section 3 presents the 
econometric methodology by focusing on definitions of the variables of interest as well as the 
ARDL model. The empirical results are discussed in Section 4, and finally Section 5 summarizes 
and concludes.  
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2. Literature Review 
The literature relating to institutions and FDI is mainly connected to the study of the impact of 
the quality of institutions on FDI inward flows. An early study on this issue has been examined 
by Wheeler and Mody (1992) for the case of U.S firms. They investigated 13 components of 
risk factors (including bureaucracy, political stability, corruption, and the legal system quality), 
but do not find any significant impact of the quality of institutions upon the location of U.S 
foreign affiliates. According to Schmieding (1993), institutions encompass not only 
bureaucracies and administration, but also more importantly, the entire body of formal laws, 
rules and regulations as well as the informal conventions and patterns of behavior that constitute 
the non-budget constraint under which economic agents can pursue their own individuals ends. 
In addition, the quality of institutions are closely related to reducing information asymmetries, 
as a high quality institution channels information about market conditions, goods and 
participants, which in turn can encourage investment, either domestic or foreign. Indeed, the 
deeper understanding of the role of institutions in stimulating the inflow of FDI is pivotal for the 
developing countries in order to design an appropriate FDI-friendly policy. 
Other empirical studies have supported the importance of institution variables in affecting 
the FDI. Wei (1997, 2000) for instance, found that uncertainty about corruption has negative 
effects on FDI location. This is due to the fact that corruption will incur additional cost of doing 
business because the investors have to bribe official in order to get licenses and permits. Besides 
corruption, Busse and Hefeker (2007) also found that government stability, internal and external 
conflict, ethnic tensions, law and order, democratic accountability of government, and quality of 
bureaucracy are highly significant in determining the foreign investment inflows in the sample 
of 83 developing countries. Kaufman et al. (1999) showed that five out of six governance 
indicators such as political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
burden, rule of law and graft play a vital role in attracting the inward FDI. Brunetti and Weder 
(1998) have found that there is a negative link between institutional uncertainty and private 
investment. In comparison, Lee and Mansfeild (1996) have found a positive relationship 
between FDI and intellectual property protection.  Du et al. (2008) found that U.S multinational 
prefer to invest in China’s region that have better protection of intellectual property rights, lower 
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degree of government intervention in business operation, lower level of government corruption, 
and better contract enforcement. Using a wider range of institution variables, Daude and Stein 
(2007) showed that inward FDI is significant influenced by the quality of institutions. 
In the Malaysian context, studies relating to the determinants of FDI have been done by 
Ang (2008), and Marial and Ngie (2009). Ang (2008) found that increases in the level of 
financial development, infrastructure, and trade openness promote FDI. On the other hand, 
higher statutory corporate tax rate and appreciation of the real exchange rate appear to 
discourage FDI inflows. The results also suggest that higher macroeconomic uncertainty induces 
more FDI inflows. In comparison, Marial and Ngie (2009) found that in the long run, the inflow 
of FDI in Malaysia is positively influenced by real exchange rate, GDP growth, and 
infrastructure, and negatively influenced by exports.  
Despites of many studies on the determinants of FDI in Malaysia, none of them have 
considered the role of institution variables in affecting the inflow of FDI. We provide a novel 
contribution to the existing literature by presenting the first empirical evidence in small open 
economy (i.e. Malaysia). Specifically, we investigate the role of institutional quality namely the 
law and order, government stability, bureaucracy, corruption, and investment profile in 
influencing the inflow of FDI. 
 
3. Estimation Methods  
3.1 Data and the Definition of Variables 
The data used in this study are yearly frequency spanning from 1984 until 2009. The aggregate 
inflow of FDI data set is collected from IFS database, while the data for institution variables are 
found from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. The data of FDI are transformed 
into natural logarithm, whereas, the data of institutional variables are kept in percentage point (in 
level form). We do not include common factors that influence FDI as studied by Ang (2008) and 
Marial and Ngie (2009) for two reasons. First, our concern is specifically on the role of 
institutions on FDI inflow that previously are often ignored. The importance of the common 
factors is well established. Concentrating on those variables would shed some light on the 
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importance of the variables. Second, putting all other variables together with institution factors 
may cause multi-collinearity problem where the institutional variables may be correlated with 
other macroeconomic variables such as high levels of human capital, open market and advanced 
financial intermediaries (Papaioannou, 2009). 
Institutions Variables 
This study considers five political risk components, namely government stability, investment 
profile, corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality in investigating the importance of 
institution variables in affecting the inflow of FDI into Malaysia. These variables are measured 
using points. Each indicator is scaled either from 0 to 12 points, 0 to 6 points, and 0 to 4 points, 
which are the highest value indicating better institution and less political risk.  Specifically, the 
detailed definition and the explanation of the institutions variables are as follow:  
(i) Government stability-12 points 
This measures an assessment both of the government’s ability to carry out its declared program, 
and its ability to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of the three components, each 
with a maximum score of four points, and a minimum score of 0 point. A score of four points 
equates to very low risk, and score of 0 points to very high risk. The subcomponents are 
government unity, legislative strength, and popular support. 
(ii) Investment Profile – 12 points 
This is an assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that not covered by other 
political, economic and financial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four points and minimum score of 0 points. A 
score of 4 points equates very low risk, and a score of 0 points to very high risk. The 
subcomponents are contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation, and payments delays. 
(iii) Corruption - 6 points 
Corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons. First, it distorts the economic and 
financial environment. Second, it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling 
people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and third, it 
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introduces an inherent instability into political process. Such corruption can make it difficult to 
conduct business effectively, and in some cases may force the withdrawal or withholding of an 
investment. The high points indicate less corruption, and less political risk to the investors. 
(iv) Law and order – 6 points 
To assess the ‘Law’ element, the strength and impartially of the legal system are considered, 
while the ‘Order’ element is an assessment of popular observance of the law.  Thus, a country 
can enjoy a high rating ‘3’ in terms of its judicial system, but low rating ‘1’ if it suffers from a 
very high crime rate if the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction. 
(v) Bureaucracy quality – 4 points 
The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to 
minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to 
countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes 
in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low risk countries, the bureaucracy 
tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism 
for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy 
receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy 
formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.  
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3.2 Econometric Modeling 
 
In order to examine long run relationship and dynamic interaction among FDI and institutions, 
this study employs an ARDL model. In general, there are three steps in estimating the model. 
The first step is to estimate the long-run relationship among the variables. This is done by testing 
the significance of the lagged levels of the variables in the error correction form of the 
underlying ARDL model. Our ARDL model can be written as follows; 
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                                                                                                                                                       [1] 
where, LFDI  is log of FDI, LAWOR  is law and order, CORRUPT  is corruption, BUREAU is 
bureaucracy, GSTAB  is government stability, and INVPRO  is the investment profile. The 
selection of the optimum lagged orders of the ARDL model are based on Akaike information 
criteria. In order to test cointegration among the variables, the Wald F-statistics for testing the 
joint hypotheses has to be compared with the critical values as tabulated by Pesaran et al. (2001).  
 
The joint hypotheses to be tested are; 
0:
0:
6543211
6543210
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ββββββ
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H
 
 
If the F-statistics is higher than the upper bound critical value, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
rejected, indicating that there is a long run relationship between the lagged level variables in the 
model.  In contrast, if the F-statistic falls below the lower bound, then the H0 cannot be rejected 
and no long run relationship exists. However, if the F-statistics falls in between the upper bound 
and lower bound critical values, the inference is inconclusive. At this condition, the order of 
integration of each variable should be determined before any inference can be made.  
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In the second step, once the cointegration is established, the conditional  
),,,,,( utsrqpARDL  long-run model of the determinants of the tLFDI  can be estimated as 
below: 
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In the final step, we obtain the short-run dynamic parameters by estimating an error 
correction model associated with the long run estimates. This is specified as follow; 
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                                                                                                                                                       [3] 
where, 654321 ,,,,, φφφφφφ  are the short-run dynamic coefficients of the model’s convergence to 
equilibrium, and ν  is the speed of adjustment. The expected signs for all the institution variables 
are positive, which indicates that better quality institutions will stimulate more foreign 
investments.   
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4. Empirical Results 
In this section, we report the results of long-run relationship of the ARDL model (Table 1 and 2) 
as well as the long run and short run determinants of FDI (Table 3 and 4).  The empirical results 
are crucial in explaining the role of the institution variables on FDI inflow in Malaysia. 
Table 1: Estimation of )2,2,1,1,2,2(ARDL model 
I. Estimated Model 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Probability 
1−tLFDI  2.236 1.936
* 0.094 
1−tLAWOR  -3.553 -3.088
** 0.018 
1−tCORRUPT  0.874 2.415
** 0.046 
1−tBEREAU  6.656 2.751
** 0.028 
1−tGSTAB  -1.034 -2.366
** 0.049 
1−tINVPRO  -1.937 -2.018
* 0.083 
1−∆ tLFDI  -2.594 -3.163
** 0.016 
2−∆ tLFDI  -1.370 -2.427
** 0.046 
1−∆ tLAWOR  1.154 0.742 0.164 
2−∆ tLAWOR  4.336 3.362
** 0.012 
1−∆ tCORRUPT  4.116 3.270
** 0.014 
1−∆ tBEREAU  -0.912 -1.373 0.212 
1−∆ tGSTAB  0.751 2.404
** 0.047 
2−∆ tGSTAB  0.596 1.481 0.182 
1−∆ tINVPRO  0.304 0.999 0.351 
2−∆ tINVPRO  -0.081 -0.361 0.728 
II. Model Criteria/Goodness of Fit 
R2 = 0.836             Adjusted  R2 = 0.484                F-statistics = 5.64(0.034)** 
III.Diagnostic Checking 
AR(2)=0.678(0.545)                      AR(4)=0.378 (0-775) 
ARCH (2)= 2.288 (0.130)             ARCH (4)=1.935 (0.160) 
JB=2.723 (0.255)                          RESET =3.072 (0.153) 
Note: * and ** indicate significance at 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. Probability values are quoted in 
brackets. AR(i) and ARCH (i) for i=2,4 denote LM-type Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM and ARCH test, 
respectively to test for the presence of serial correlation and ARCH effects at lag i. JB and RESET stand for Jarque-
Bera normality test, and Ramsey Regression specification error test, respectively. 
 
12 
 
Table 1 shows the estimation results of equation (1) using )2,2,1,1,2,2(ARDL . The R-
square indicates that 83.6 percent of the variation in the response variables can be explained by 
the institution variables. The robustness of the model is confirmed by several diagnostic tests 
such as Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test, ARCH test, Jacque-Bera normality test, and 
Ramsey RESET specification test. All the tests reveal that the model has the desired econometric 
properties, such that it has a correct functional form and the model’s residuals are serially 
uncorrelated, normally distributed and homoskedastic. Therefore, the results reported are valid 
for reliable interpretation. 
Table 2: Bounds Test for Cointegration Analysis 
Critical Value (k=6) Lower Bound Value, I(0) Upper Bound Value, I(1) 
10% 2.12 3.23 
5% 2.45 3.61 
1% 3.15 4.43 
Notes:  
The computed F-Statistics in the estimation model in equation (1) is 3.54 (significant at 10 percent significance 
level). Critical values are cited from Pesaran et al. (2001), Table CI(iii), Case III (unrestricted intercept and no 
trend). 
 
In Table 2, the results of the bound cointegration test show that the null hypothesis of 
0: 6543210 ====== ββββββH  against its alternatives 0: 6543210 ==≠≠≠≠ ββββββH  
is rejected at the 10 percent significance level. The computed F-statistics of 3.54 is greater than 
the upper bound value of 3.23 at 10 percent significance level. This indicates that there exists a 
long-run relationship among the FDI and the institutions variables (law and order, corruption, 
government stability, investment profile, and bureaucracy). 
The second step is to estimate the long run model of the determinants of FDI. Table 3 
reports the estimation results. As can be seen, three institutional variables, namely corruption, 
government stability, and bureaucracy are positively and statistically significant at least at 5 
percent significance level in influencing the inflow of FDI. This indicates that, in the long run, 
the level of corruption, government stability, and bureaucracy in Malaysia would affect the 
inflow of foreign investments to Malaysia. These findings send important signals to leaders and 
policy makers of the country. Thus, it is imperative for them to offer better quality domestic 
institutions by minimizing the element of corruption, maintaining or increasing the government 
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stability, and reducing the government bureaucracy in order to attract more inflow of foreign 
investments.  
Table 3: Estimation of Long Run Coefficients  
Regressors Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio Probability 
1−tLFDI  0.110 0.210 0.523 0.607 
1−tLAWOR  0.343 0.214 1.597 0.127 
1−tCORRUPT  0.570 0.243 2.333
** 0.031 
1−tBEREAU  1.198 0.364 3.288
*** 0.004 
tGSTAB  0.134 0.063 2.130
** 0.047 
tINVPRO  0.128 0.152 0.839 0.412 
R-square 
Durbin-Watson  
F-statistics 
Prob (F-Statistics) 
0.692 
2.193 
6.745 
0.000 
 Note:  
ARDL (1,1,1,1,0,0) lag for each variable is selected based on AIC. Dependent variable is LFDI 
***, **, *  is significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The results of unit root tests are discussed in the 
appendix.  
 
 
Table 4: Estimation of Short-Run (VECM) Model 
Regressors Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio Probability 
1−tECM  -1.253 0.293 -4.265
*** 0.001 
1−∆ tLFDI  0.107 0.214 0.500 0.623 
1−∆ tLAWOR  -0.273 0.234 -1.169 0.260 
1−∆ tCORRUPT  0.779 0.537 1.451 0.166 
tBEREAU∆  1.049 0.500 2.098
* 0.052 
tGSTAB∆  0.264 0.100 2.641
** 0.018 
tINVPRO∆  -0.193 0.143 -1.351 0.195 
R-Square 
Durbin-Watson 
F-Statistic 
Prob (F-statistics) 
0.678 
1.937 
4.816 
0.004 
Note:  
ARDL (1,1,1,0,0,0) lag for each variable is selected based on AIC. Dependent variable is ∆LFDI 
***, **, *  is significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
14 
 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of the short-run model using )0,0,1,1,1,1(ARDL . As 
shown, only two variables, namely bureaucracy and government stability are positively and 
statistically significant at least at 1 percent significance level in influencing the inflow of FDI. 
The ECM variable which explains the speed of the adjustment is also significant at 1 percent 
significance level. This indicates that there is a long run causality from institution variables to the 
inflow of FDI.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
Although the determinants of FDI have been examined extensively in the previous studies, less 
attention has so far been given to examining the role of institutional variables upon FDI inflows; 
particularly in a small open economy (i.e. Malaysia). This paper extends the existing literature by 
providing new empirical evidence about the role of quality of institution on FDI inflow. 
Specifically, we examine the role of institutional factors, namely corruption, government 
stability, bureaucracy, law and order, and investment profile in affecting the FDI inflow in 
Malaysia. Considering the short annual sample size, the ARDL or bound testing procedure is 
used to examine the long run relationship and the causality direction (long run, and short run) 
among the variables of interest.  
 
The main findings can be summarized as follows. First, there is a long-run relationship 
among institutional variables and FDI inflow to Malaysia. Second, in the long-run and short run, 
several institutional variables namely government stability, the level of corruption, and 
bureaucracy are statistically significant in influencing the inflow of FDI.  
 
The findings would be of concern to Malaysian leaders and policy makers. Maintaining 
government stability has to be given high priority as this will not only lead to better management 
of the country but it also attracts foreign MNEs to come in and do business. In the long run, this 
supports Malaysian economic growth. In addition Malaysian government must also reduce or 
even eliminate the level of corruption in the country as high level of corruption has been proved 
to deter foreign investments. Moreover, eliminating bureaucracy that hinders the prospects of 
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FDI growth in Malaysia can be another strategy that can be implemented. In summary, offering 
sound and quality institutions in Malaysia should be a must. This is because sound and quality 
institutions create a FDI-friendly environment, and in turn stimulate continuous inflows of FDI. 
As Malaysia is losing to its neighbours in attracting new FDI, the above mentioned actions seem 
to be urgent, otherwise Malaysia will be left behind in the near future. 
 
This study is not without its limitations. First, as mentioned earlier, explaining the 
determinants of FDI inflow usually involve macro variables such as a well-developed financial 
system (financial deepening), favorable growth performance, high trade openness, excellent 
infrastructure development, low country risk as well as attractive fiscal and monetary incentive. 
We do not control these variables as the use of these variables will only add to the list of 
independent variables. Using too many parameters in the model will result in the loss of degree 
of freedom.   In addition, this study does not take into account other important institutions 
variables which can also influence the behavior of foreign investment. For instance, a good 
property right protection, a good quality of education system, no risk of expropriation and   
dimensions of market efficiency are also important and should be considered precisely by the 
government. Second, an institutional variable is often inadequate to explain the behavior of 
MNE’s. Therefore, a good interaction between institutional variables and other macro variables 
such as a well-developed financial system (financial deepening), favorable growth performance, 
high trade openness, excellent infrastructure development, low country risk as well as attractive 
fiscal and monetary incentive are also vital in order to attract the inflow of FDI to the host 
countries. In fact, all these variables are complementary to each other. For instance, quality of 
institutions has no meaning if the host countries (particularly LDC’s) do not have a well-
developed financial system, excellent infrastructure and other sound environment in order to 
maintain the inflow of foreign investment. Therefore, further study should consider testing the 
hypothesis that the interaction between institutional quality and other macro variables has a 
separate influence on the FDI inflow to the host countries.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Results of the Unit Root Tests 
Panel A: Level form, I(0)  
 
 
Variable 
ADF Philip-Perron (PP) 
Constant and no 
trend 
Constant and 
with trend 
Constant and no 
trend 
Constant and 
with trend 
LFDI -2.026     (1) -3.109     (4) -2.234    (2) -2.177   (1) 
CORRUPT -1.694     (1) -2.247     (2) -1.439    (2) -2.080   (2) 
LAWOR -4.863*** (3) -4.711*** (3) -2.163    (3) -2.092   (2) 
BUREAU -1.520     (4) -3.586*    (3) -1.559    (2) -2.142   (1) 
GSTAB -3.209*** (5) -2.264     (2) -1.680    (2) -1.641   (1) 
INVPRO -1.973     (1) -4.307**  (1) -1.639    (2) 2.922    (2) 
Panel B : First Difference, I(1) 
LFDI -3.522**   (2) -3.602*   (1) -5.718***  (2) -5.720*** (1) 
CORRUPT -3.284**   (1) -2.498    (2) -4.576***  (1) -4.643*** (1) 
LAW -2.965*    (1) -6.235*** (4) -3.156**   (3) -3.195     (1) 
BUREAU -3.052**   (2) -3.142    (1) -4.326***  (1) -4.364**  (1) 
GSTAB -3.640**   (1) -3.646    (1) -3.638**   (2) -3.680**  (1) 
INVPRO -4.033***  (1) -3.943** (2) -3.892*** (2) -3.859**  (2) 
Note: Number in parenthesis is the optimum lag based on Akaike information criteria (AIC). The null hypothesis is 
that the series is non-stationary, or contains a unit root. The rejection of the null hypothesis for both ADF and PP 
tests is based on the MacKinnon (1994) critical value.Critical values for the ADF and PP test without a trend are: -
3.75, -3.00 and -2.62 at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Critical values for the ADF and PP 
test with a trend are: -4.38, -3.60 and -3.24 at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. ***, **, and * 
denotes the rejection of the null at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Table A1 reports the results of unit root tests of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
Philips-Perron (PP). Based on ADF test, three institutional variables, namely law and order 
(LAWOR), government stability (GSTAB), and investment profile (INVPRO) are stationary at 
level form at least at 5 percent significance level. However, based on PP, all variables are non-
stationary at level form. All series are stationary at first difference form, either with ADF or PP 
test. Based on ADF test results, applying Johansen procedure to cointegration would not be 
possible as there is a mixture of I(0) and I(1) series. This provides a rationale for us to use the 
bound test approach, or ARDL model proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001). 
 
 
